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Restoring the "Central Meaning of the




[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression;
it is the essence of self-government.'
The first amendment commands that "Congress shall make no
law .. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...."I
Although the language of the amendment is unqualified, the "abso-
lute" view of the first amendment, which holds that the language
means exactly what it says,' has never commanded the support of a
majority of the Supreme Court." Government's power to regulate
speech in some form has always been accepted,' and consequently,
balances must be struck. Libel - a publication that is injurious to
the reputation of another" - is not excepted from this balancing
process. Legal doctrines of libel present the difficult task of accom-
modating the common law concern of an individual's interest in rep-
utation with the first amendment's protection of free speech.
When the Supreme Court initially applied the first amendment
to the common law of libel in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,8
twenty years ago, free speech advocates saw the decision as cause for
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I. Justice Brennan, writing in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Justice Black was probably the strongest advocate of this view. For a summary of
Justice Black's position, see Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, Sup. CT. REV.
245, 247-49 (1961).
4. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and Meiklejohn's Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1965).
5. Courts will subject certain regulations to rigorous scrutiny, see, e.g., Brown v. Har-
tlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). Other regulations
dealing with speech such as obscenity or fighting words are not subject to any constitutional
scrutiny. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (5th ed. 1979).
7. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, (D.C. Cir. 1984).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
dancing in the streets.9 In New York Times, the Court held that a
public official could recover from media only upon proof that he had
been libeled knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth.'"
Emphasizing a free society's need for open and robust political de-
bate, the Court's decision seemed to establish the protection of politi-
cal speech as the core meaning of the first amendment. 1 Although
the Court provided only a qualified immunity in New York Times,
the new standard was a radical break from prior precedent and
promised to insulate media from the "chilling effect" that libel suits
can produce. 2
The recent proliferation of libel suits and the rising cost of their
defense have created uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of the
New York Times rule.' 3 Although part of this proliferation can be
explained by a change in society's attitude towards litigation, 4 the
standard established in New York Times also appears to be at fault.
The qualified privilege as developed by New York Times' progeny
turns on factual questions, and as such it has failed to discourage
litigation. A new standard is needed to restore New York Times'
promise of uninhibited, robust political debate. This standard should
focus on the Court's original concern - insulating political debate
from the chilling effect of libel suits. Thus, statements about political
matters should be accorded absolute immunity from libel suits, with
the balancing of personal reputation and free expression reserved for
statements made outside the political context.
This paper will first trace the development of the New York
9. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," Sup. CT. REv. 191, 221 n.125 (1964) (quoting Professor Meiklejohn).
10. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
II. See generally Kalven, supra note 9; Brennan, supra note 4; Meiklejohn, supra note
3.
12. See Lewis, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 608 (1983).
13. See generally Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 747 (1983); Franklin and Bussel, The Plaintiffs Burden in Defamation: Awareness
and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (1983); Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A
Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Frank-
lin]; LeBel, Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 779 (1983); Lewis, supra note 12; Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation
of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1983); Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 905 (1983).
Recently, the Supreme Court itself has divided over the proper scope and effectiveness of
the New York Times standard. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 2939, 2943-44 (1985), a plurality of three reaffirmed the privilege for speech on matters of
public concern that is embodied in New York Times and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974). Four dissenting justices asserted that the plurality's defense of New York
Times was too weak. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2954 (Brennan, J., dissenting). At the
other extreme, Justice White and Chief Justice Burger, in concurring opinions, expressed their
dissatisfaction with the "improvident balance" struck in that case. Id. at 2950 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
14. See Smolla, supra note 13, at 14-18.
Times standard. An historical survey will point out how cases follow-
ing New York Times failed to focus on the political interpretation of
the first amendment and concentrated instead on the status of the
defamed party. As a result, the first amendment's core meaning was
diluted, and libel law doctrines became confused. Next, the paper
will discuss the recent surge in libel litigation and will hypothesize
reasons for this proliferation. The article will then consider the facts
of Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.15 as a paradigm of the problem. It
will argue that the premise of the New York Times opinion was cor-
rect but that its rule - a qualified privilege - no longer works. An
absolute privilege is proposed. Finally, the paper will present poten-
tial problems associated with according political commentary abso-
lute immunity and will rebut these concerns.
I. New York Times and Its Progeny: The Failure of the Qualified
Immunity Standard
For over 175 years of American jurisprudence, libelous speech
was regarded as a tort in the form of a personal assault and hence
was outside the ambit of the first amendment. 6 The law of defama-
tion was first subjected to constitutional scrutiny in the landmark
New York Times decision. The New York Times case arose from a
libel suit brought by the police commissioner of Montgomery, Ala-
bama against the New York Times Company and four black clergy-
men. The alleged defamatory publication was a paid advertisement
seeking contributions for the civil rights movement in the South. The
advertisement did not name the plaintiff directly, but it leveled
charges of brutality and harassment against the police that were in-
accurate in a few details. Under Alabama law, as in a majority of
American jurisdictions, defamatory statements were libelous as a
matter of law if the defendant could not establish their complete
truthfulness.17 Accordingly, an Alabama jury awarded the plaintiff,
and the Alabama Supreme Court upheld, damages of $500,000. This
was the largest libel award ever given in Alabama up to that time.
Arguing that the advertisement was protected by the first
amendment right of free speech and that the imposition of a state
libel award violated that constitutional right, the New York Times
Company sought and was granted certiorari review by the United
States Supreme Court. In its opinion, the Supreme Court focused on
what it considered to be the core meaning of the first amendment:
The "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
15. 97 F.R.D. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
16. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 631 (1978).
17. See Kalven, supra note 9, at 195.
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials."1 8 The Court rec-
ognized that "erroneous" statements are inevitable in free debate,
and it refused, therefore, to uphold a legal standard that required
defendants to prove the truth of their statement. 19 Fearing the "chil-
ling effect" of self-censorship that the threat of a libel suit could
create, the Court ruled that a public official could not recover for
defamation unless he proved that the statement was made with "ac-
tual malice" - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.20 Applying the
principle that reviewing courts should undertake an independent ex-
amination of the factual record in first amendment cases, the Court
concluded that Sullivan did not satisfy the actual malice standard on
the basis of the evidence presented at trial. 2
1
The New York Times opinion is premised on a politically-ori-
ented interpretation of the first amendment.22 In its opinion, the
Court undertook a historical review of seditious libel and the Sedi-
tion Act of 1798 and found the concept of seditious libel fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the first amendment. The Court established
the special political need for almost complete freedom to question
the actions of government officials as the justification underlying its
decision.23 New York Times extends protection beyond pure truth
because the line between truth and falsity is not always clear, and
providing too little protection could have a chilling effect on constitu-
tionally valuable speech.2" The actual malice standard established in
New York Times, therefore, is designed to provide a safety zone
within which the media can operate with relative security.25
Despite the broad protection for comments concerning political
affairs, the Court in New York Times stopped short of providing a
rule of absolute immunity for expression defaming public officials. 26
18. 376 U.S. at 270.
19. Id. at 278-79.
20. Id. at 279-80.
21. Id. at 285-92.
22. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 918.
23. See generally Brennan, supra note 4; Kalven, supra note 9.
24. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2951
(1985) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Un-
raveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Chilling
Effect].
25. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277-80.
26. Justices Black and Goldberg wrote separate concurring opinions in New York
Times criticizing the majority for providing a limited protection and calling for absolute pro-
tection. 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice
Black stated:
In my opinion the Federal Constitution has dealt with this deadly danger to
the press in the only way possible without leaving the free press open to destruc-
A plaintiff who meets the actual malice standard may recover both
compensatory and punitive damages.27 Thus, the New York Times
opinion seemed to create a contradiction.28 On the one hand, the
Court's emphasis on seditious libel appeared to establish the concept
of self-government as the core meaning of the first amendment. On
the other hand, the Court provided that core meaning with only a
qualified immunity. New York Times' progeny have sought to define
the actual malice standard and to determine when that standard
should apply by distinguishing between public and private figures
and by differentiating statements of opinion from statements of fact.
Cases following New York Times have refined and clarified the
actual malice standard. Neither "malice" nor "recklessness" as used
by the Court in New York Times has the same meaning as at com-
mon law. 29 Actual malice requires a plaintiff to establish by "clear
and convincing proof that the defendant had knowledge of, or reck-
lessly disregarded the falsity of the statement."30 Thus, this standard
raises the normal preponderance of evidence standard generally ap-
plicable in civil actions.3' To show a reckless disregard of truth, the
plaintiff must establish that the defendant "in fact entertained seri-
ous doubts as to the truth of his publication. 3 2 Consequently, reck-
lessness in this context is a subjective test and is not measured by a
reasonably prudent person standard.33 The actual malice standard,
then, presents libel plaintiffs with a difficult legal obstacle.
The determination of when the actual malice standard should
apply is the major libel law issue with which courts have struggled
since New York Times.3 4 Initially, the Supreme Court seemed to
place a predominant emphasis on the interest of free expression. 5
tion - by granting the press an absolute immunity for criticism of the way
public officials do their public duty. Compare Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564.
Stopgap measures like those the Court adopts are in my judgment not enough.
Id. at 295 (Black, J., concurring).
27. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
28. See Berney, Libel and the First Amendment - A New Constitutional Privilege, 51
VA. L. REV. 1 (1965).
29. See Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970); St. Amant
v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
30. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971).
31. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86; see also Schauer, supra note 13, at 907;
Tribe, supra note 15, at 636.
32. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
33. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 907.
34. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939
(1985); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 424
U.S. II I(1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); see also Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as
First Amendment "'Public Figure": Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IOWA L. REV. 35 (1982).
35. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Rosenbloom a plural-
ity of the Court applied the New York Times actual malice standard to defamatory statements
Public figures, such as movie stars, singers and football coaches,
were treated like public officials and were required to meet the ac-
tual malice standard.3 6 In addition, private individuals who thrust
themselves into the "vortex" of public controversies discovered that
they too must prove knowing or reckless falsity to recover in defama-
tion suits.3 7 Ten years after New York Times, however, the Court
reassessed the trend of libel law and retreated from its emphasis on
the interest of free expression by recognizing the individual's interest
in reputation. 38
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,39 the Supreme Court established
the distinction between public figures and private individuals. The
plaintiff in Gertz was an attorney who represented the family of a
youth slain by a Chicago policeman. Viewing the conviction as part
of a plot to discredit police forces, American Opinion, a paper advo-
cating the views of the John Birch Society and owned by the defend-
ant, published a story charging Gertz with overseeing the "frame-
up" of the police officer. In the article, Gertz was labeled a "Lenin-
ist" and a "communist-fronter." There was no basis for these
charges. Despite the public controversy surrounding the issues in
Gertz, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was a private citi-
zen and, therefore, need not meet the actual malice standard. The
Court, reasoning that a private individual has an interest in protect-
ing his reputation, held that states could set any level of protection
for a private plaintiff "so long as they do not impose liability without
fault.""' Thus, where a public official or a public figure must prove
actual malice, a private individual need only prove negligence."'
The public/private figure distinction announced in Gertz has
proven difficult to apply.' 2 It is not always clear when an individual
has obtained the status of a public figure."' The Court's introduction
of the "public controversy" concept has confused matters further."
related to a private person's involvement in a matter of public concern. 403 U.S. at 52.
36. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
37. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
38. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 347.
41. It should be noted, however, that under Gertz a private figure who proves only
negligence is limited to a recovery of actual damages. Id. at 349. To recover presumed or
punitive damages, a private figure still has to meet the New York Times standard and prove
actual malice. Id. Recently, however, the Court has added to its constitutional libel labyrinth
by holding that private persons who are libeled in matters involving no "public concern" can
recover presumed and punitive damages without a showing of actual malice. See Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2946 (1985).
42. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 433 U.S. 157 (1979); Schauer, supra note
13 at 906.
43. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
44. See generally Note, Defining a Public Controversy in the Constitutional Law of
A plaintiff can become a public figure either by virtue of her position
or by entering the "vortex" of a public controversy." Although
Gertz indicates that newsworthiness is insufficient to transform an
individual into a public figure, the boundaries of a "public contro-
versy" remain unclear." The result of this confused state of the law
is uncertainty, both on the part of potential plaintiffs and the media.
The opinion/fact distinction evolving from New York Times
and its progeny has also created uncertainty. 7 The Gertz decision
suggested this distinction when, in dicta, the Court seemed to pro-
vide absolute immunity for defamatory statements in the context of
an opinion." Circuit courts have followed this distinction and have
held that courts, as a matter of constitutional law, must provide
opinion with absolute first amendment protection. 9 The rationale
supporting the absolute protection accorded opinions is the belief
that there is no such thing as a "false" opinion.50 Because the opin-
ion/fact distinction rests on the statement's status rather than on the
plaintiff's status, an opinion is immune whether it concerns a public
or private figure.6
The opinion/fact distinction, like the public/private figure dis-
tinction, involved the Court in the difficult task of line drawing. 2
Lower federal courts have struggled to distinguish opinion from
fact, 5  and circuit courts have developed a number of conflicting
tests. 4 Consequently, rather than helping to clarify the waters of
libel law, the opinion/fact distinction has only made them murkier.
5
Defamation, 69 VA. L. REV. 931 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Defining a Public Controversy].
45. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
46. See Defining a Public Controversy, supra note 44.
47. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
48. The Gertz Court began its constitutional analysis by stating:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. As Thomas
Jefferson made the point in his first Inaugural Address: "If there be any among
us who would wish to dissolve this Union or change its republican form, let them
stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may
be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40, 440 n.8.
49. See, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hammerhead
Enterprises, Inc. v. Brezenoff, 707 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 237
(1983); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 192-94 (1st Cir. 1983), affd on
other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 642 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980).
50. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975-76 (D.C Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 975.
52. Id. at 993 (Bork, J., concurring).
53. id. at 977.
54. Compare id. at 979 (adopting a four-part test) with Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche,
551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub. nom., Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434
U.S. 834 (1977) (a single factor test) and Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Com-
puter Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980) (a three factor test).
55. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 994 (Bork, J., concurring); see also R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER,
In focusing on the actual malice standard of the qualified im-
munity concept of New York Times, courts have lost sight of the
core meaning of the first amendment. 56 The Supreme Court's em-
phasis on seditious libel in New York Times demonstrates that the
Court meant to protect political speech. 57 Treating movie stars and
singers like highway commissioners and state senators dilutes the
concept of self-government. It might be interesting, or even news-
worthy, to know the facts of a celebrity's sex life, but it is not essen-
tial to the democratic process. Moreover, trying to discern an opinion
from fact clouds the true issue because it does not involve an inquiry
into the political nature of the statement. In spreading the protection
of New York Times beyond political affairs, the Court undercuts the
media's legitimate justification for a strict constitutional shield.5 B A
society that cherishes open political debate may be willing to afford
a buffer zone to ensure that the media is uninhibited in its reporting,
but providing that same protection for nonpolitical affairs can result
in resentment and may account for some of the public's hostility to-
wards the press.59
New York Times has spawned practical as well as legal
AND RELATED PROBLEMS 155 (1980); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 820
(4th ed. 1971).
56. Not all speech is accorded the same constitutional protection. Accordingly, obscene
speech or "fighting words" are afforded no protection. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1952); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957). Commercial
speech is reviewed under an intermediate level of scrutiny. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Vir-
ginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436
U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm'n., 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 (1980). In contrast, speech concerning politics forms the core of the first amend-
ment's concern. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940); First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2945 (1985). The Court has stated,
The First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U. 254, 269 (1964). "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that
speech on public issues occupies the "'highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values'" and is entitled to special protection. NAACP v.
Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 467 (1980).
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); see also Lewis, supra note 12, at 622; Schauer,
supra note 13, at 908-09.
57. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 273-76; see also Kalven, supra note 9, at 205;
Lewis, supra note 12, at 620-23.
58. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 623. The Court has begun to recognize some of the
problems implicit in extending the New York Times rule. Accordingly, in Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., the Court indicated that the first amendment has only limited application to commercial
libel. 105 S. Ct. at 2945.
59. Recent studies have shown that juries are more likely to find for a plaintiff than for
a media defendant in a libel suit. This disturbing fact has caused some commentators to specu-
late that some of these jury verdicts stem from the public's hostility towards the press. See
Franklin, supra note 13, at 8-13.
problems. In practice the actual malice standard has tended to en-
courage full-scale litigation rather than decisions upon motions for
summary judgment.60 The question of actual malice and its focus on
subjective states of mind is a factual issue that is not amenable to
settlement by a motion to dismiss.6 1 The public/private figure dis-
tinction and the opinion/fact distinction, although questions of law,
are also questions that normally require some probing in discovery
before they can be decided. 2 Because the expense of a full trial is
significantly higher than that of a case decided on summary judg-
ment, the cost factor can have a chilling effect on the media's will-
ingness to cover controversial topics.
Although the actual malice standard presents a plaintiff with a
formidable array of legal hurdles," this standard has failed to dis-
courage the filing of libel suits. In defamation suits against the me-
dia, plaintiffs receive and retain judgments in less than ten percent
of the cases.64 Nevertheless, instead of seeing a decline in libel litiga-
tion, recent years have witnessed an increase. 5 Accompanying this
proliferation has been a marked increase in the damages sought in
defamation actions. 6 Despite the fact that media defendants prevail
in the majority of libel cases, they generally do so on appeal. At the
trial level, plaintiffs win more than eighty percent of the cases tried
before a jury.67 This disturbing statistic concerning jury verdicts
reveals a second practical problem with the actual malice standard
- juries are confused by the legal complexities of the New York
60. See Schiarone Construction Co. v. Time, Inc., No. 83-932 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 1985).
This case involved a libel suit arising out of an article Time published concerning the back-
ground of former Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan. After carefully explaining the need
for a quick resolution of a libel suit brought against a media defendant, the court stated,
"However, notwithstanding the court's fears regarding the effect of the mere pending of ac-
tions such as these, binding precedent does not permit a summary disposition of the matter
here presented in favor of the defendant." Id., slip op. at 3.
61. See supra note 60.
62. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the court stated that
questionable opinion statements "are the stuff of which litigation is made").
63. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 907.
64. R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG. & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL AND THE PRESS: SETTING THE
RECORD STRAIGHT 5 (Silhar Center for the study of Media Ethics and Law School of Jour-
nalism and Mass Communication, University of Minnesota No. 85061) (1985) [hereinafter
cited as LIBEL AND THE PRESS].
65. See Smolla, supra note 13, at 1-4; Franklin, supra note 13, at 1-5; Lewis, supra
note 12, at 603.
66. The Washington Post has paid $2 million to the president of Mobil Oil Corpora-
tion. Carol Burnett recovered $1.6 million from the National Enquirer which on appeal was
later reduced to $200,000. Although set aside on appeal, a jury awarded a former Miss Wyo-
ming $26.5 million in a suit against Penthouse Magazine. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 608.
67. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 613 (citing the Libel Defense Resource Center Bulle-
tin, Summary Judgment in Libel Litigation:L Assessing the Impact of Hutchinson v. Proxmire
(Oct. 5, 1982)); Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 795 [hereinafter cited as Litigation Study].
Times rule and often misapply it.68
Of even more concern than the threat of an adverse verdict, are
the vast sums spent in defending defamation claims. Millions of dol-
lars may be spent in legal fees to defend a single case. It is difficult
to accurately gauge the overall costs of litigation, but estimates in-
clude: ABC spending seven million dollars to settle a claim;69 CBS
paying three to four million dollars in legal fees for one case;70 and
Time magazine paying two million dollars to dismiss a claim before
trial. 1 In addition, it is estimated that between seventy-five and
eighty percent of the cost of libel insurance is based on the antici-
pated cost of defense rather than a payout to a successful plaintiff.
72
Furthermore, the cost is not limited to actual dollars spent. Large
scale law suits involve a great deal of time, stress and distraction
from the business of reporting. 73 Discovery can be particularly bur-
densome in libel litigation and can affect the editorial process and
compromise its independence. 4 Winning libel suits, therefore, often
results in Pyrrhic victories for media.
While defendants pay a high price in libel actions, the fact re-
mains that plaintiffs rarely prevail. 75 Given such a poor success rate,
the question arises why plaintiffs keep suing. The uncomfortable an-
swer seems to be that libel suits for damages are only a means to a
different end.76 Experts believe that more than half of all libel suits
are "nuisance" cases that have no real hope for ultimate success.
77
Speculation on plaintiff's hidden motives includes: discouraging me-
dia from covering certain groups or activities;78 revenge and retalia-
tion against media;79 a desire to clear one's name;80 and political mo-
tives. 81 Whatever libel plaintiffs' motives, it appears that the New
68. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 612-13.
69. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 13.
70. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 612.
71. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 14.
72. Id. at 19.
73. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 609.
74. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (the Supreme Court rejected CBS's
argument that intensive discovery in a libel suit violated the first amendment).
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
76. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 5.
77. See id. at 6 (quoting Larry Worrall, head of Media/Professional Inc. Co.); see also
Riley, Fighting Back: What Redress Media Have Against Frivolous Libel Suits, 59 JOURN. Q.
566 (1982).
78. Examples of this motive include certain religious and police associations seeking to
discourage press coverage. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 6-7.
79. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 204 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Oilman
v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
80. General Westmoreland's suit against CBS has been identified as such a case. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
81. Ariel Sharon's libel suit against Time magazine Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F.Supp.
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), has been recognized as such a suit. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1985, at
23, col. 5; see also Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment, 42
York Times' promise of uninhibited and wide-open debate is not
working. Although it is difficult to assess the impact that the threat
of libel suits has on the investigative behavior of media, the fear is
that media will impose a degree of "self-censorship." 82
II. The Westmoreland Case: A Paradigm of the Problem with Li-
bel Suits
The need for reform of the New York Times standard is well
illustrated by the recent case of Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc."5 In
September 1982, General William C. Westmoreland filed a 120 mil-
lion dollar libel suit charging that CBS defamed him by falsely ac-
cusing him of lying to President Lyndon Johnson and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.8 The allegations concerned a CBS documentary,
"The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," that was broadcast
January 23, 1982 to a national television audience estimated at 9.6
million.8
5
The documentary charged that, for political reasons, General
Westmoreland's command deliberately distorted the true size and
nature of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in South Viet-
nam in the months before the Tet offensive of January 1968. Specifi-
cally, the broadcast accused General Westmoreland of imposing an
"arbitrary ceiling" of 300,000 on reports of enemy strength and al-
leged that Westmoreland's senior aides had systematically blocked
reports by junior officers that showed higher numbers.8 "
The sixteen counts of libel alleged by General Westmoreland
against CBS and the producer, narrator, and consultant for the pro-
gram were only discrete elements of a larger thesis of a conspiracy
put forward by CBS. 7 Underpinning the thesis was a combination of
facts and opinion, which together formed the following picture.
COLUM. L. REv. 1085 (1942).
82. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 16-18; Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
83. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
84. Vietnam to Courtroom. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at B7 [hereinafter cited as
Vietnam to Courtroom.
85. Id.
86. Farber, A Joint Statement Ends Libel Action by Westmoreland, N.Y. Times, Feb.
19, 1985, at B6.
87. General Westmoreland called the "centerpiece" of his complaint the following
statement made at the beginning of the broadcast.
The fact is that we Americans were misinformed about the nature and size of
the enemy we were facing, and tonight we're going to present evidence of what
we have come to believe was a conscious effort - indeed, a conspiracy at the
highest levels of American military intelligence - to suppress and alter critical
intelligence on the enemy in the year leading up to the Tet offensive.
Memorandum in Support of Defendant CBS' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment
[hereinafter Memorandum], at 4, Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
Reports of enemy strength were first developed by the American
Military Command in Vietnam (MACV) in 1962.88 Those reports,
referred to as the enemy "Order of Battle" (OB), were regularly
prepared by a military intelligence staff throughout the course of the
conflict. Because the Vietnam war was viewed by the Johnson Ad-
ministration as a "war of attrition," these estimates of the number of
enemy troops were significant in assessing the progress or lack of
progress of the war effort.
Estimates of the size of the enemy forces depended, for their
accuracy and consistency, on whom the military intelligence chose to
count. From 1962 to 1966, four categories of the enemy were in-
cluded in the OB: (1) Combat, or Regulars, consisting of Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese Main and Local forces; (2) Combat Support,
or administrative services and logistical units; (3) Militia, or Irregu-
lars, including guerillas, self-defense and secret self-defense person-
nel; and (4) Political Cadre, also called the political infrastructure.
When General Westmoreland was appointed commander of the
American forces in Vietnam in June 1964, those forces numbered
fewer than 18,000 military advisors and support personnel. Ameri-
can combat forces were first sent to Vietnam in 1965. By the end of
1966, 400,000 American soldiers were in Vietnam, and another
100,000 were scheduled to arrive in 1967. This American troop
buildup was described by the Administration both as a necessary re-
sponse to the growing enemy strength and as the force that would
turn the tide in South Vietnam's favor. The Administration's goal,
which was communicated to Westmoreland in a February 1966
meeting in Hawaii, was to reduce enemy strength by the end of 1966
by destroying enemy forces faster than they could be replaced.
At the end of 1966, however, as doubts about the war were
growing both inside and outside the Administration, the MACV re-
ports showed a total enemy strength of 300,000 - an increase over
figures from earlier that year. In April 1967, General Westmoreland
reported optimistically to President Johnson that the "crossover"
point had been reached. By May, however, military intelligence was
allegedly reporting enemy strength at 500,000. A cable to Washing-
ton from Westmoreland's chief intelligence officer citing the 500,000
figure was prepared but never sent, allegedly on Westmoreland's or-
der. According to that officer, Westmoreland stated that the higher
enemy figures would have been a "political bombshell." In June that
officer was reassigned out of Vietnam.
In response to those higher 1967 figures, Westmoreland alleg-
88. This statement of facts is based on material contained in the Memorandum, id. at
5-10 and Appendix A to Memorandum, at A40-79.
edly imposed an official ceiling of 300,000 on reports of enemy
strength. As a result, his subordinates dropped Self-Defense, Secret
Self-Defense and Political Cadre from the categories of enemy forces
in the OB. According to some, military intelligence also systemati-
cally reduced estimates of the remaining categories.
In contrast to the MACV estimates of 300,000, the CIA's esti-
mates in mid-1967 were in the range of 460,000 to 570,000. Conse-
quently, a conference was held in August 1967 to reconcile the
MACV and CIA estimates. The deadlock was not broken until Sep-
tember, when a ranking CIA official, meeting with Westmoreland in
Saigon, was instructed by the CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence
to accommodate the MACV demands. The lower enemy estimates
were then official accepted.
In November and December 1967, the MACV was reporting a
decline in enemy strength to 250,000. On January 30, 1968, how-
ever, the Viet Cong launched the Tet Offensive, a surprise assault on
Saigon, thirty-nine other cities and towns and most military installa-
tions in South Vietnam. That the enemy could launch such a mas-
sive, concerted attack shocked both President Johnson and the
American public and led to new calls for an end to the war. It was
suggested in Congress that America's unpreparedness was the result
of misleadingly low estimates of troop strength received from the
field.89
This outline of the facts on which the CBS broadcast was based
is only a distillation of the disputed history. The complexity of this
"fact pattern" is just one characteristic of the Westmoreland case
that shows the need for reform of the New York Times standard.
The case falls squarely in the category of seditious libel: criticism by
citizens or the press of a public official's professional conduct. The
allegedly libelous statements derive from a confusing mixture of in-
dividuals' opinions and facts, both stipulated and arguable. 90 To-
gether the facts and opinions comprise a historical thesis which, like
any other historical thesis, may not be provable as true or false. Fi-
nally, the cost of this mammoth lawsuit was extraordinary - ap-
proximately three million dollars to the plaintiff alone. In the after-
math of the Westmoreland settlement, one scholar remarked, "Large
89. The war's denouement was marked by a series of significant events. In March
1968, President Johnson announced that he would not seek re-election. In July 1968, General
Westmoreland became Chief of Staff of the Army and was replaced in Vietnam by General
Creighton Abrams. In June 1971, The New York Times published excerpts from the Pentagon
Papers, a study of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which had been commissioned in 1967 by
Secretary of Defense McNamara. In April 1975, Saigon fell to the Communists.
90. Judge Pierre Leval denied CBS's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that there were sufficient questions of fact to warrant a trial. "Vietnam to
Courtroom," supra note 84, at B7.
libel suits are really death grips in which parties clutch each other
for months if not years, at enormous pain and expense to both of
them."91
III. A Proposal for a Standard that Returns to the Central Mean-
ing of the First Amendment
The solution to the problems exemplified by Westmoreland and
other recent libel cases does not require a dramatic break from pre-
cedent. That solution is contained in the core meaning of the first
amendment and was recognized by the Supreme Court over twenty
years ago in New York Times. The opinions, both majority and con-
currences, were premised on "a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, wide-open . *... -2 This premise was correct. The Court's es-
tablishment of a qualified privilege, however, failed to carry out the
full scope of the principle. The proper solution is an absolute privi-
lege for speech in a political context.
This absolute privilege is compelled by the central meaning of
the first amendment.9" The Framers did not intend to incorporate the
English common law of seditious libel, which punished speech or
writings critical of government officials or their policies;9 rather,
such defamation was considered a theoretical impossibility in a de-
mocracy.9" The new American system embraced the radical notion
that political power originates in the people, who are the governors,
not the governed. Through the Constitution the people delegated cer-
tain powers to agencies of the central government and retained those
powers not delegated. 96 Among the powers retained were the rights
of free speech, press, and assembly - the mechanisms by which peo-
ple, in effect, govern the government. Following this theory, the first
amendment is viewed as a reminder to government that the people
retain these powers.97 The government is put on notice that it has no
91. Floyd Abrams, quoted in Margolick, Risks in Litigation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19,
1985, at B7.
92. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 296 (Black, J., concurring);
id. at 298-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
93. But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2952
(White, J., concurring) ("Nothing in the central rationale behind New York Times demands
an absolute immunity from suits to establish the falsity of a defamatory misstatement about a
public figure where the plaintiff cannot make out a jury case of actual malice.").
94. Kalven, supra note 9, at 193 n.9; see also Tribe, supra note 15, at 632. This view
of the Framers' intent is the product of hindsight. While some scholars believe that the first
amendment originally incorporated the English law of seditious libel, most agree that this con-
clusion was soon reversed in the political furor over the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. See
Levy, The Legacy of Suppression, cited in Kalven, supra note 9, at 193 n.9.
95. Kalven, supra note 9, at 205.
96. Meiklejohn, supra note 3, at 253; see also Brennan, supra note 4, at 11.
97. Meiklejohn, supra note 3, at 254; compare Brief for the Petitioner, at 56, New
power to silence criticisms of its citizens.
The New York Times decision embraced this theory of the cen-
tral meaning of the first amendment in its focus on the Sedition Act
of 1978. By going out of its way to declare the Act unconstitutional,
the Court reinforced the historical conclusion that silencing political
debate is inconsistent with the American concept of self-govern-
ment.9" But the Court undercut the force of its premise by settling
for a privilege qualified by the actual malice test.
This failure to establish an absolute privilege consistent with its
reading of the first amendment suggests some pragmatic balancing
by the Court. 99 Even the qualified privilege effected sweeping
changes in the states' common law of defamation. Taking the next
step of adopting an absolute privilege might have raised uncomforta-
ble questions concerning federalism and the propriety of judicial ac-
tivism. While some restraint must have seemed desirable to the
Court, the compromise it struck must also have appeared sufficiently
"activist" to be effective. Since the qualified privilege protected hon-
est mistakes and exaggeration, it was reasonable at the time to as-
sume that most cases would probably be covered. 100
While the Court's balancing of state law interests with first
amendment rights might not be unreasonable on issues such as ob-
scenity, such balancing was inappropriate in the realm of political
speech. 10 1 As the authors of the concurring opinions in New York
Times rightly pointed out, the qualified privilege was merely a "stop-
gap measure" that did not afford even the minimum protection guar-
anteed to political speech by the first amendment.102 These warnings
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ("The citizen acts in his 'sovereign capacity'
when he assumes to censure the officialdom.").
98. New York Times 376 U.S. 254, 276 ("Although the Sedition Act was never tested
in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.").
99. Kalven, supra note 9, at 217. Commentators have generally recognized some govern-
mental power to inhibit speech consistent with the first amendment. Brennan, supra note 4, at
11; Tribe, supra note 15, at 671. However, of the restrictive test usually cited - e.g., "re-
deeming social value" test for obscenity, "clear and present danger" test for subversive activity
or obstruction of justice, or a balancing test for regulation of time and place - none seems to
have been applied to political speech.
100. These factors, put forward by Kalven, supra note 9, at 219-20, suggest that estab-
lishing an absolute privilege would have been too daring for the time. Even if this is so, the
current confused state of constitutional libel law provides sufficient grounds for extending the
rule beyond what was acceptable twenty years ago.
101. Professor Wechsler made this point in his brief, supra note 97, at 51 ("[N]or is this
a case of conflicting governmental interests with which the protected speech must be reconciled
. ... ). But as a pragmatic advocate, he also noted that the malice standard might represent
a constitutional compromise. Id. at 54. For a discussion of the Wechsler brief, see Lewis, supra
note 12, at 605-07.
102. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295, 297 (1964) (Black, J., con-
curring). Justices Black and Douglas, recognizing that state libel suits can be an effective
technique for harassing and punishing a free press, called for absolute press immunity for
criticism of the way public officials do their jobs. Id. at 295. While Justices Black and Douglas
focused exclusively on the press, Justices Goldberg and Douglas wrote separately to advocate
have been borne out over the last twenty years in the proliferation of
libel suits that chill the rights of citizens and the press to criticize
public officials and their policies.
Empirical evidence indicates that the New York Times' actual
malice standard is constitutionally deficient. Focusing on the pub-
lisher's malice or the defamed party's status has produced inconsis-
tent results. The following standard is therefore proposed: matters of
political concern should be given absolute protection from libel
suits.108 In all other cases, the states may establish standards to pro-
tect an individual's reputation provided liability is not imposed with-
out fault. 10
The problem of line drawing will still exist under this standard;
however, by focusing on the concept of self-government, the line
drawing will be more principled. Pure political discussion or com-
ments about political figures in their public capacity present clear
answers. Under the proposed standard, these subjects would be com-
pletely immune from libel suits. Regardless of whether the state-
ments are true or false, if such statements concern a public official's
duties, society's need for open debate requires that the offended indi-
viduals seek their redress with opposing speech, not in the court-
room. Thus, Jesse Helms, Jesse Jackson, Caesar Chaves, or Eliza-
beth Dole would have no legal claim for statements criticizing their
political activities.
This standard also clarifies the treatment of comments about
individuals in nonpolitical matters. Whether the person is a celebrity
or a private citizen, he has a recognizable interest in his reputation
that is not offset by society's need for open political debate. Defama-
tory remarks about individuals in nonpolitical contexts, therefore,
should be actionable under the Gertz formula.10 5 Thus, Michael
Jackson, Carol Burnett or Jane Doe should be able to recover for
defamatory statements as long as negligence is proved.
A gray area will still exist. Politics does not take place in a vac-
uum, and other subjects, such as art and literature, affect it. Al-
though it is clear that a statement about an entertainer's sexual pref-
erence is nonpolitical in nature, a personal attack on a public official
raises questions. In dealing with these difficult questions, a totality
of the circumstances test, which analyzes the statement's relation to
the absolute privilege for both individual citizens and for the press. Id. at 304.
103. A number of commentators have proposed similar absolute standards. See, e.g.,
Lewis, supra note 12, at 620-24; Del Russo, Freedom of the Press and Defamation: Attacking
the Bastion of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501, 525-26 (1981).
104. This is the Gertz formula which is currently applicable to "private figures." See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
105. Id.
politics, should be used. 106 Included in this test would be factors such
as: the contexts in which the statement is made; the activities in
which the subject of the statement is engaged; where the statement
appeared; and who made the statement."' Although this test may
not always be clear cut, and parties may still want to pursue litiga-
tion, the test is a question of law. Thus, unlike the actual malice
standard, this test is capable of being answered on a motion for sum-
mary judgment.
IV. Critique and Rebuttal
An absolute constitutional privilege barring libel suits for state-
ments about public officials or political affairs is subject to criticism.
This criticism ranges from the theoretical to the practical. The crit-
ics who advance these arguments seem to prefer the qualified privi-
lege because it embodies a balancing of interests. Specifically, critics
of the absolute privilege place a higher value on individual reputa-
tion and often seem to distrust the press' respect for that value.
Foremost among this criticism is the argument that there should
be some check to prevent publication of deliberate lies.' 08 According
to this view, the Court properly limited the constitutional privilege to
truth or unintentional falsehoods because deliberate lies are "at odds
with the premise of democratic government" and make no contribu-
tion to orderly social progress.10 9 Insofar as a known lie fails to ad-
vance public debate, critics argue that is has no redeeming social
value and deserves no constitutional protection.110
Coupled with this concern about the deliberate lie is a related
fear that affording absolute protection would allow political com-
mentators to destroy reputations at will.111 Noting that political
commentary has exhibited a tendency to avoid discussion of issues
and instead concentrate on candidates' characters, courts are reluc-
tant to provide an unqualified privilege. 1 ' Justice Stewart articu-
lated additional concerns when he stated:
The preventive effect of liability for defamation serves an impor-
106. This totality of the circumstances test is adapted from a suggestion made by Judge
Bork. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 102-10 (Bork, J., concurring).
108. This is the justification Justice Brennan gave for the qualified immunity provided in
New York Times. See Brennan, supra note 4, at 18-20.
109. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
110. Id; see also Brennan, supra note 4, at 18-19.
Ill. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). Although
critics of the absolutist position concede that harm to personal reputation is hard to measure,
they argue that the solution should be greater control over damages, not a blanket immunity.
See Franklin, supra note 13, at 26.
112. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1038-39 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting in
part).
tant public purpose. For the rights and values of private person-
ality far transcend mere personal interests. Surely if the 1950s
taught us anything, they taught Us that the poisonous atmo-
sphere of the easy lie can infect and degrade a whole society.
13
The harm to a reputation that flows from a deliberate lie occurs as
soon as defamatory words are published. Even if further speech ex-
poses the lie, critics of the absolutist position argue that the harm to
both the individual and society is already done.""
The realities of mass media provide skeptics with support for
their view that the threat of deliberate lies is real. A major justifica-
tion for an absolute privilege springs from the view that the way to
counteract speech is not by legal sanctions but by "more speech."115
This justification depends upon a marketplace of ideas with numer-
ous voices contributing to public debate. Skeptics point out, however,
that the recent trend is towards consolidation of media into huge
television networks and newspaper chains. As the media become con-
trolled by fewer and fewer voices, there will be no educating process
of "more speech" because there will be no opposing voices.
In further support of their position rejecting the absolute privi-
lege, critics cite the fact that some larger publishers also oppose an
absolute privilege.116 Three interrelated justifications are suggested
to support this seemingly contradictory stance. First, the knowledge
that a defamation suit could be brought acts as a check against inac-
curacies and sloppy reporting.1 1 7 Second, aware that libel suits act as
a check, readers place more confidence in media reporting. 1 Fi-
nally, responsible publishers fear that unreliable publishers may act
so outrageously that an inevitable backlash would result in legal con-
straints that are more stringent than the current actual malice
standard. 119
An absolute privilege premised on a political interpretation of
the first amendment is criticized as ignoring theoretical justifications,
other than politics, that support the right of free expression. 2 Even
113. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). Libel law can
also act as a counter balance to political propaganda. See generally Riesman, supra note 81
(where the author presents a particularly frightening example of the Nazis' use of lies, often
directed at public officials' private lives, to discredit and eventually unseat moderates in
government).
114. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 24.
115. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
116. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 26 (quoting Alice Neff Lucan, counsel to Gannett
Company).
117. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 28 (citing Hunsacker, Freedom and Responsibility
in First Amendment Theory: Defamation Law and Media Credibility, 56 Q. J. OF SPEECH 25
(1979)).
118. Id.
119. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 26-27.
120. See Schuaer, supra note 13, at 929-35.
if democratic self-government is recognized as the core meaning of
the first amendment, this meaning embraces more than pure polit-
ics. "'21 Art, literature and related nonpolitical speech must also be
protected. Critics point to two dangers that a politically oriented in-
terpretation of the first amendment may create. Either the amend-
ment's protective shield will be extended to cover other nonpolitical
speech, thereby causing the core meaning to become diluted and un-
clear, or the ambit of the first amendment's protection will be nar-
rowly drawn, thereby causing other theoretical justifications for pro-
tecting free speech to be treated as irrelevant.122 Equally troubling to
critics is the concern that an absolute ban based on politics will in-
volve judges in the undisciplined and judicially dangerous task of
subjectively deciding what is and what is not politically related. 23
These criticisms pose legitimate questions about the wisdom of
recognizing an absolute privilege for discussion of official policy and
conduct. At issue is this basic question: If the current standard pro-
vides substantial protection for first amendment interests, why pur-
sue a new, radical solution that may upset the balance and thereby
jeopardize those interests? The answer is, first, that the absolute
privilege is not a radical solution; it was inherent in the logic of the
Court's opinion in New York Times. But the crucial answer is that
the substantial protection once provided by the actual malice stan-
dard is no longer sufficient. It is important, then, to examine the
premises underlying arguments against a stronger standard to deter-
mine whether the fears of these critics are, in fact, justified.
The most compelling argument against an absolute privilege is
that is condones deliberate lies. The issue is not falsity per se, be-
cause the New York Times rule protects unintentional errors and
exaggeration.124 Indeed, the Court noted that a false statement may
even contribute to public debate because it highlights and clarifies
the truth.12 Rather, the issue is whether constitutional protection
should be afforded to a deliberate lie used as a political tool to oust a
121. See Meiklejohn, supra note 3, at 263; Kalven, supra note 9, at 221.
122. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 930-32.
123. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting in
part). Coupled with this charge is the additional argument that creating an absolute ban would
constitute judicial activism in its worst form.
124. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72 ("Authoritative interpretations of the First
Amendment [sic] guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test
of truth . . . .Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected
if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . .to survive'
125. Id. at 279 n.19; but see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 2939, 2950 (1985) (White, J., concurring) ("[Tihese First Amendment values are not at
all served by circulating false statements of fact about public officials. On the contrary, errone-
ous information frustrates these values").
public official or an administration.126
In the area of true political commentary - an area requiring
the greatest protection under the first amendment - the argument
that an absolute privilege would protect deliberate lies does not re-
flect reality. The majority of political commentary deals with issues
of policy in which there simply are no truths or falsehoods. "[I]n
many areas which are at the center of public debate, 'truth' is not a
readily identifiable concept, and putting to the pre-existing
prejudices of a jury the determination of what is 'true' may effec-
tively institute a system of self-censorship."'
127
The Westmoreland case illustrates this point. The "conspiracy"
alleged by CBS was not a true-or-false factual issue, but a conclu-
sion drawn from an array of data. Whether Westmoreland's ceiling
of 300,000 troops was truer than his officers' higher estimates turned
on an interpretation of statistics which are susceptible to manipula-
tion to support many conclusions.1 18 In deciding the question of fal-
sity in Westmoreland, the jury would have had to analyze volumi-
nous data just as military intelligence officers had done in 1967. If
those officers could not agree on the true conclusion to be drawn
from the numbers, it is doubtful whether a jury could do better - or
should be allowed to try. In the majority of cases accorded absolute
protection, therefore, the deliberate lie is not a problem because
questions involving political policy do not have true or false
answers. 129
Moreover, an absolute privilege would eliminate the chilling ef-
fect now created by the actual malice standard. The actual malice
standard fails to reflect the reality that political speech does not deal
with questions of truth or falsehood. By basing liability on findings
of deliberate falsehood in situations where there can be no such
126. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); Reisman, supra note 113, at
1289.
127. Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
128. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 620. This point is humorously suggested in the titles
of two how-to books that were popular a few years ago: WINNING WITH STATISTICS (Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co., 1977) and How To LIE WITH STATISTICS (Norton Publishing Co.,
1954).
129. By contrast with Westmoreland, Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp 538 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) presents an example of clear truth and falsity in political speech. In that case, Time
magazine reported that Mr. Ariel Sharon, then Minister of Defense of the State of Israel, met
with the Gemayel family of Lebanon and discussed with them the need for the Phalangists to
take revenge for the assassination of Bashir Gemayel. Id. at 543. Time reported further that
the details of the conversation were not known. Id. Sharon claimed that these and other state-
ments in the article were false and defamatory. Id. The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York noted that most of the Time article was "absolutely protected either as
opinion or as the fair report of a judicial proceeding." Id. at 542-43. In contrast with West-
moreland, the libelous statements in Sharon were not inferences of policy judgments, but
rather rumors passed off as fact, for which "nothing in the first amendment requires ...
absolute freedom ...". Id. at 554.
thing, the qualified privilege creates a chilling effect on true political
commentary. The most visible source of this chilling effect is in the
large number of libel cases regarding political speech now reaching
juries. Libel cases under the New York Times rule survive both mo-
tions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment because actual
malice depends upon a finding of subjective intent. The costs of dis-
covery and litigation can bankrupt small publishers who often es-
pouse unpopular views. 130 The mere threat of litigation may en-
courage self-censorship. Indeed, some plaintiffs unabashedly employ
the libel suit as a tool to harass the press and force self-censorship in
coverage of their activities.' The emergence of special-interest fun-
draising organizations designed to finance big libel suits also rein-
forces the view that libel suits have become a political tool for plain-
tiffs. 132 Once such a suit is commenced any alternatives for dispute
resolution are foregone. In Sharon v. Time Magazine, for example,
the defendant would have been foolish to retract its statement that
Sharon proposed revenge for fear that the retraction would be used
in court as evidence of the statement's falsity. By allowing plaintiffs'
cases to reach the jury on the question of subjective intent, the ac-
tual malice standard chills commentary on political conduct and pol-
icy - a result that would not occur with recognition of an absolute
privilege.
Statements not involving policy, however, can embody factual
truths or falsehoods to which the question of a deliberate lie is appli-
cable. Justice Brennan premised his rejection of the absolute privi-
lege in such cases on the principle that deliberate lies cannot be tol-
erated or accepted as an element of our social life.' 3 Today's critics,
however, do not imitate Brennan's principled concern but instead
seem to premise their view on a basic distrust of the press. They
would probably admit that outright frauds on the public, such as the
story entitled "Jimmy's World" that was run in The Washington
Post, are very rare. However, they cite sloppy journalism and the
economic pressure to "scoop" a story as examples of reckless disre-
gard for truth that the actual malice standard discourages. The false
report of James Brady's death, broadcast after the attempt on Presi-
dent Reagan's life, exemplifies this disregard.
The press has its own system of objective self-regulating princi-
ples that vitiates the frequency and impact of such potential reck-
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lessness. 3 4 The author of "Jimmy's World," who perpetrated a
fraud on her employer, the Post, as well as on the public, was fired
and her Pulitzer Prize was withdrawn. The Post published a public
apology that was widely reported in the media, generating debate
and criticism. Similarly, the network's retraction of its false report
on Brady made headlines and prompted a flurry of criticism in the
media. Even the Sharon case, with its political overtones, exemplifies
this process of press self-regulation on questions of factual truth or
falsehood. Whether Appendix B contained the libelous statement by
Sharon was a question of fact which, when determined to be false,
drew a barrage of criticism against Time and its journalistic prac-
tices. In these situations, the press moved publicly to reform itself,
thereby generating more speech and debate on the issues.
The actual malice standard fails to compel the careful reporting
that would eliminate such cases of reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of a factual statement. The honesty of a news report is most
often based not on the subjective intent of the researcher or writer
- which is all that is tested by the actual malice standard - but in
investigative procedures and practices. The actual malice standard
does not address such practices; rather, it is the truth/falsity prong
of the New York Times rule under which investigative procedures
are considered. Whether research on a given article is adequate, for
example, goes more to the question of the article's accuracy than to
the writer's state of mind.
The supposed protection against deliberate lies afforded by the
qualified privilege is thus illusory; an absolute privilege would not
reduce the level of that protection. The subjective intent test is irrel-
evant to most political speech situations where the statements at is-
sue do not turn on truths or falsehoods. In genuine cases of factual
inaccuracies caused by reckless journalism, the standard is superflu-
ous because the press tends to regulate itself. The critics' basic dis-
trust of the press' commitment to factual accuracy is not addressed
by the actual malice standard.
Speech generated by the press' confessions of factual inaccura-
cies furthers the principle of robust debate in the political arena.
Press self-regulation would be no less likely to exist under an abso-
lute privilege than it currently does under the actual malice stan-
dard. In fact, a press protected by an absolute privilege would be
more likely to increase its self-regulation to assure the public of its
continued credibility. But critics reject this argument on the grounds
134. See, e.g., American Society of Newspaper Editors Statement of Principles and The
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that the media, described as a monolithic, self-serving institution,
would not contribute to the marketplace of ideas but would instead
pursue its economic interests at the expense of a diversity of
viewpoints.
If an issue turns on distrust of an institution, as this criticism
seems to, the solution often lies in greater governmental regulation.
But such is not the case with press reporting of political news be-
cause of the nature of the American political system. The American
press should be extraordinarily free and vigorous "not because it is
free of inaccuracy, oversimplification, and bias, but because the al-
ternative to that freedom is worse than those failings." 135 The Amer-
ican press is a "fourth estate," the source of organized, expert scru-
tiny of government and an ideal structural check on official power.136
As government grows in size and complexity, the need for such a
countervailing power center becomes even more evident. This was
certainly the lesson of Watergate. It is also the lesson of the McCar-
thy hearings in this country and of the Nazis' use of deliberate lies
to discredit moderate public officials in Germany.' When the pub-
lic is fed such deliberate lies by its government, the press is admit-
tedly the conduit, but government regulation is not the answer. Only
an aggressive investigative press such as uncovered Watergate could
take on a Joseph McCarthy.
Many argue, however, that even as a fourth estate the press
should be subject to checks and balances as are the three branches of
government. At present, under the actual malice standard, the courts
act as such a check. The threat of a libel suit serves as a form of
external regulation to discourage inaccuracies and recklessness. But
if the press should be regulated, are courts the proper regulators?
In defense of the court's regulatory role, some commentators ar-
gue that courts are an indispensable "investigative instrument . . .
in forcing historical truth into the public record."'31 8 Citing courts'
institutional power to compel production of relevant evidence, these
commentators argue that lawsuits become a focal point for intensive
investigation. 89 The libel suit itself becomes a newsworthy event
that an absolute privilege would stifle.
Although the extensive media coverage of the Westmoreland
and Sharon cases supports the assertion that such lawsuits stimulate
public debate, the idea that courts are the proper forum in which to
135. OIlman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
136. Address by Justice Stewart, The Free Press: The Great American Risk, reprinted
in 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (excerpts).
137. Brennan, supra note 4, at 18-19; see also Reisman, supra note 110.
138. Cockburn, The Value of Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, E. (Week in Review),
at 19.
139. Id.
conduct this debate is premised on a number of erroneous assump-
tions. Central to the "investigative forum" view of the courts is the
assertion that the "function of the courts is, after all, to arrive at the
truth. 1 40 Truth, however, is an illusory concept in political contro-
versies. Because the absolute privilege would be limited to matters of
political concern, the vast majority of libel suits accorded absolute
protection would involve disputes in which there is no "truth." Using
the courts as investigative fora could have the undesirable effect of
establishing "unassailable" verdicts.
Democratic societies place the burden of deciding general politi-
cal questions on each citizen. If the public perceives a verdict as es-
tablishing a "truth," a judge or a six-person jury will have usurped
the role of the people. The cases afforded absolute immunity involve
more than limited legal questions. Consequently, whereas a jury or
judge is the proper substitute for the public's judgment in most legal
controversies, in matters of general political concern the question
should be left to the public as a whole.
More important, using courts to investigate public controversies
means an acceptance of the politicization of courts. The justification
for permitting libel suits rests on the vindication of an individual's
reputation.14 2 Yet, the investigative view of courts is not concerned
with this limited purpose. 1" 3 Rather, this view endorses the use of
courts to explore wide-ranging political questions. Such a political
use of the courts could ultimately undercut the legitimate, institu-
tional role of the judicial branch. To function effectively, a factfinder
must be perceived as neutral. This perception would be difficult, if
not impossible, to maintain where the recognized purpose of the fo-
rum is to investigate general political questions. The courts would
not be applying legal rules to disputed facts; instead, they would be
revisiting history and attempting to graft a verdict of truth on ques-
tions that have no legal issue. Although courts have always been a
forum for dispute resolution, they have traditionally recognized that
political questions are outside the ambit of their jurisdiction."'
The Westmoreland case illustrates the dangers of using libel
suits to explore political questions. In large part, the media coverage
of Westmoreland was a response to the public's interest in the politi-
cal justification for the Vietnam War. General Westmoreland's repu-
tation was a subquestion. Yet, this subquestion was the main concern
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of the libel suit. Failing to distinguish the broad political question
from the narrow legal question allows a court to be used as a plat-
form for arguing a political perspective. Had CBS been found liable,
Westmoreland would have been able to argue that his role in the
Vietnam War was vindicated. Hence, a verdict on the narrow legal
question could be misconstrued as a verdict on the broad political
question. Such a result would inevitably affect the role of courts in
our political system.
Closing the courts as the forum for investigating matters of
public concern does not mean that such investigation will not take
place. There is a need to explore broad political questions. Instead of
misusing courts for this purpose, other fora, such as congressional
committees or investigative news programs, should, and would, be
used to a greater extent. The primary value of a libel trial is its
ability to gather relevant data and thereby provide a focal point for
extensive news coverage. The subpoena power of a congressional in-
vestigating committee or the public exposure available in a news pro-
gram make these fora equally potent. Shifting the focus of the con-
troversy to these alternative fora would facilitate necessary debate,
allowing the public to draw its own conclusions without diminishing
the institutional value of courts.
V. Conclusion
With the settlement of the Westmoreland suit, the Supreme
Court is not immediately confronted by the need for reform of the
New York Times standard. The urgency for such reform is nonethe-
less evident, and the circuit courts will surely reflect that urgency in
concurring and dissenting opinions. The scholarly literature is al-
ready full of empirical studies and alternative proposals. Amidst this
ferment, however, the central meaning of the first amendment as
recognized in New York Times remains unchanged. Recent experi-
ence with the proliferation of chilling libel suits demonstrates that
the absolute privilege for speech and writing in a political context is
the best protection for that principle.

